THE EASTER OFFENSIVE OF 1972 by Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong Published by U.S. Army Center Of Military History Webpages created by bnpham@foxinternet.net
Contents
Glossary
THE EASTER OFFENSIVE OF 1972
PrefaceIn 1968, a U.S. presidential election year, Communist North Vietnam initiated the Tet Offensive, striking at almost all major cities and towns of South Vietnam. This general offensive was eventually defeated by the collective efforts of the Republic of Vietnam, United States and Free World Assistance forces. Four years later, in l972~gain a U.S. presidential election year North Vietnam threw its entire military might behind an invasion to conquer the South. This time, however, South Vietnam had to fight for survival with only logistics and combat support provided by the United States. Almost all U.S. and Free World Military Assistance combat forces had been withdrawn when the first attacks began on 30 April 1972. By all standards, the Easter Offensive of 1972 was one of North Vietnam1 5 most significant initiatives during the Vietnam War. This all out effort involved eventually in excess of ten divisions on each side and affected the lives of well over a million South Vietnamese people. During the eight long months of fierce fighting, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces put Vietnamization to a severe test. During the period of the Easter Offensive, I had the privilege of participating in some of its major battles, first as IV Corps and then as I Corps commander beginning in early May 1972. I visited many of our combat units as they fought the North Vietnam Army and commanded the RVNAF counteroffensive to retake Quang Tri City. My critical analysis of the enemy 1972 Easter Invasion, therefore, is based almost exclusively on my own personal observations, impressions and interviews with Vietnamese who were directly involved. I am indebted to several distinguished officers of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces whose contributions I wish to acknowledge here. My gratitude first goes to General Cao Van Vien, Chairman of the Joint General Staff, RVNAF and my former airborne commander, who has provided me with several untold aspects of the offensive as seen from his vantage point and valuable guidance. Next, Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen, Commander of the Central Logistics Command, RVNAF, has contributed his unbiased comments on the joint RVNAF-US logistic effort to keep the areas under siege resupplied. Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh, who served in my corps as commander, 3rd ARVN Division and who successfully rebuilt and reshaped this division into a strong combat unit, has provided me with his critical comments and judicious observations. Finally, Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho and Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung, the J- 3 and J-2 of the Joint General Staff respectively, have contributed significant information concerning combat operations and intelligence from the JGS echelon. Finally, I am particularly indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Chu Xuan Vien and Ms. Pham Thi Bong. Lt. Colonel Vien, the last Army Attache serving at the Embassy in Washington, D. C., has done a highly professional job of translating and editing that helps impart unity and cohesiveness to the manuscript. Ms. Bong, a former Captain in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and also a former member of the Vietnamese Embassy staff, spent long hours typing, editing and in the administrative preparation of my manuscript in final form.
McLean, Virginia Ngo Quang Truong 31 August 1977 Lieutenant General, ARVN
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Chapter | Page |
I. INTRODUCTION | 1 |
From Insurgency to Conventional Warfare | 1 |
General Character of the Easter Offensive | 9 |
II. THE INVASION OF QUANG TRI | 15 |
Situation Prior to the Offensive | 15 |
The Initial Battles | 24 |
Holding The Line | 31 |
The Fall of Ouang Tri City | 41 |
III. STABILIZATION AND COUNTEROFFENSIVE | 48 |
The Defense of Hue | 48 |
Refitting and Retraining | 60 |
Quang Tri Retaken | 64 |
Role of V.3. Air and Naval Support | 75 |
IV. DEFENDING KONTUM | 78 |
The NVA Force Build up | 78 |
The Attacks On Tan Canh and Dakto | 86 |
Pressure on Kontum City | 92 |
The First Attack Against Kontum | 95 |
The Enemy's Final Attempt | 101 |
V. THE SIEGE OF AN LOC | 106 |
The Enemy's Offensive Plan in MR-3 | 106 |
The Attack On Loc Ninh | 115 |
The Siege and First Attacks | 116 |
The Second Phase of Attack | 128 |
Relief from the South | 131 |
Mopping Up Pockets of enemy Resistance | 134 |
VI. ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN THE MEKONG DELTA | 137 |
The Setting | 137 |
Kompong Trach: The Opening Round | 144 |
The Hau Giang Under Attack | 145 |
Actions in the Tien Giang | 149 |
Attacks in Dinh Tuong | 151 |
The Aftermath | 153 |
VII. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS | 157 |
North Vietnam's Objectives, Strategy and Tactics | 157 |
The Defense Posture of South Vietnam | 160 |
RVNAF Performance | 168 |
U. S. Support | 171 |
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS | 175 |
GLOSSARY | 182 |
Note about page numbers: Page numbers are provided the same way as in the original book to facilitate the citing of the document in the same fashion as one might have done from the original book.
Some of the page numbers skip because of the maps and pictures in the original book. However the book in this electronic form is complete except for the pages 172 and 173 which the web page creator will attempt to locate in the near future.