Table 1 - GVN Released Results for LAM SON 719 (1)

ALLIED LOSSES UNITED STATES Dead: 102 Wounded: 215 Missing: 53	ENEMY LOSSES TROOPS Dead: About 13,000 (Saigon government figure)
SOUTH VIETNAM Official Unofficial Figure report ------------------------ Dead: 1,146 3,800 Wounded: 4,236 5,200 Missing: 246 775	WEAPONS Captured or Destroyed: 1,968 crew-served 4,545 individual
HELICOPTERS Destroyed: 92 Cost about $30 million Damages to others about $10 million	VEHICLES Captured or Destroyed: 100 tanks 291 trucks
PLANES Destroyed: 5 Cost about $8 million	SUPPLIES Captured or Destroyed: 128,000 tons of ammunition 1.3 million drums of gasoline 7,600 yards of pipeline Food, medicine and clothing

(1) - This information was published in the American Newsweek magazine, April 5, 1971, P.29

RVNAF and United States casualties including killed, wounded and missing as reported through military channels for all of LAM SON 719 totaled 9,065. Most of the 7,683 RVNAF casualties were incurred by the tactical units that participated in the operations in Laos; the 1st Infantry Division and the Airborne Division absorbed over one half of this total. (Table 2)

Table 2 - LAM SON 719 Cummunlative Casualties (2)

UNIT	FRIENDLY KILLED WOUNDED MISSING TOTAL

XXIV Corps - 101st Airborn Division 1st Bde, 5th Inf Division 11thBde, 23rd Inf Division XXIX Corps Artillery Other Support Forces Total	68 55 47 9 36 215	261 431 256 76 125 1149	17 3 7 0 11 38	346 489 310 85 172 1402
I Corps - 1st Infantry Division Airborn Division Marine Division 1st Armored Brigade 1st Ranger Group I Corps Troops Total	537 455 355 54 93 55 1549	1607 1993 770 364 435 314 5483	537 0* 63 0 27 24 651	2681 2448 1188 418 555 393 7683
Sum-Total (Adjusted)	1764	6632	689	9065

* It was not true that there was absolutely no MIA for the Airborne Division. Based on first hand information, the author knew that a number of Airborne officers and troops were captured bythe enemy. (2) Excerpt from "An Assessment of the Performance of South Vietnamese Forces During Operation LAM SON 719: 30 January - 6 April 1971" by Headquarters, US XXIV Corps, dated 3 May 1971.

I Corps casualties thus represented about 45% of the maximum 17,000 troops that were committed during the most active phase of the operation. For LAM SON 719, I Corps had deployed a total of 42 battalion size combat units of which 34 actually fought in lower Laos. Four ARVN battalions suffered losses so severe that they had to be reconstituted; six others, while suffering losses considered "moderate," still managed to fight as units. As to U.S. casualties they were incurred partly in combat activities conducted in South Vietnam, partly in helilift and air support activities in Laos.

Table 3 - Major Items of Equipment Lost or Destroyed (3)

ITEMS	US	RVNAF	TOTALS
Small Arms Individual Weapons	363	2,107	2,470
Small Arms Crew Served Weapons	98	320	418
Trucks	67	211	278
Combat Vehicle	76	87	163
Tanks	17	54	71
Artillery	4	96	100
Radios	61	1,516*	1577
Bulldozers	6	31	37

* Figures provided by RVNAF and used as the basis for requisitioning replacement items. Apparently not all were combat losses. (3) After Action Report, LAM SON 719, Headquarters, U.S. XXIV Corps, 14 May 1971, p. 90.

Equipment and materiel losses for both U.S. and ARVN forces are outlined in Table 3. On the ARVN side, the most noteworthy losses were the 87 combat vehicles (to include M-113 armored personnel carriers and similar vehicles), 54 light tanks (M-41), 96 artillery pieces (of both 105-mm and 155-mm), 31 bulldozers, and over 1,500 radio sets. Most tanks and armored vehicles were damaged and destroyed during combat but the losses also included those left behind which were not able to maneuver around ambush sites. Among the 96 artillery pieces lost, the majority had been damaged by enemy counter battery fire before being left behind in evacuated fire support bases; the remaining were destroyed by ARVI4 artillery troops prior to their withdrawal. No Page 127 engineer machinery was brought back. In fact, the 101st Combat Engineer Battalion and a platoon of the 118th Engineer Land Clearing Company lost all of their heavy equipment. As to the enemy, his human losses were considerably higher than those suffered by the RVNAF. (Table 4)

Table 4 - Enemy Casualties, LAM SON 719 (4)

Enemy Losses Reported by	U.S.	RVNAF	Total
Killed	4,795	14,565*	19,360
Captured	8	49	57

* Includes enemy personnel killed by U.S. tactical air and B-52s discovered by ARVN troops conducting operations in Laos (4) After Action Report, LAM SON 719, Headquarters, U.S. XXIV Corps, 14 May 1971, p. 90.

To counteract the ARVN incursion into his most vital logistic base area, the enemy deployed, and the figures were later confirmed, 12 infantry regiments belonging to five different divisions, and at least an armor regiment and an artillery regiment. Total enemy combat strength thus committed in the LAM SON 719 area of operation was estimated at 30,000, not to include reserve elements. In addition, the enemy logistic structure in the general area of operations also had from 10 to 20,000 Page 131 men. Out of this total, the enemy lost an estimated 20,000 men or about one half. But while his losses caused by actual combat engagements could be generally verified, his casualties inflicted by artillery and aerial bombings could only be estimated. Bomb damage assessments could only be obtained on approximately 10% of all B-52 missions. Even in those areas where search and bomb damage assessments were conducted an accurate body count vas not always possible, partly due to the immensity and ruggedness of the terrain and partly due to the unbearable stench produced by masses of badly decomposed human bodies. Enemy equipment losses throughout the campaign were also substantial; major categories are summarized in Table 5.

Table 5 - Enemy Equipment Losses (5)

Items	Quantity	Observations
Individual Weapons Crew Served Weapons Vehicles Combat Vehicles Tanks Artillery/Mortars Radios Ammunition Rice	5,170 1,963 2,001 11 106 13/93 98 170,364 tons 1,250 tons	Reported by USAF (RVNAF ground troops confirmed 422 trucks) U.S.verified 88 U.S. verified 20,000 tons

(5) Ibid, p. 91.

Page 132 Most enemy vehicles were destroyed by U.S. gunships and tactical air. So were enemy tanks of all types which largely consisted of the amphibious PT-76's and a number of T-34's and T-54's, all Russian made. The ammunition destroyed included an important quantity of artillery shells and rockets, also Russian made. In addition, the enemy fuel pipeline originating in North Vietnsm and running through the LAM SON 719 area of operations was cut in several places. United States Combat Support No account of LAM SON 719 would be complete without mentioning the importance of U.S. support. In closing the balance sheet on friendly and enemy losses, credit should be duly given to the role performed by U.S. Army Aviation, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Naval Air for without them, LAM SON 719 could hardly have been possible. Topping the scale and from the point of view of the ARVN infantry man, U.S. Army Aviation units contributed by far the most important kind of support. In total, U.S. Army gun-ships and other types of helicopters flew over 90,000 sorties for the benefit of ARVN forces, to include nearly 24,000 gun-ship sorties, over 34,000 trooplift sorties and nearly 20,000 logistic related sorties. (Table 6) To carry out their vital support mission, U.S. Army Aviation units suffered losses in Laos amounting to 82 aircraft of all types destroyed and over 600 aircraft damaged but recoverable. (Table 7) U.S. Army pilots and crew members who sacrificed their lives in combat numbered 55 while 178 others were wounded and 34 were listed as missing in action.

Table 7 - U.S. Army Aircraft Damaged and Destroyed

Type Aircraft	Damanged*	Destroyed In Laos In South Vietnam Total	Grand Total
OH6A OH58 UH1C UH1H AH1G CH47 CH53 CH54 Total (Non-hostile)	25 15 63 316 158 26 13 2 ---- 618 (4)	4 4 7 43 20 3 1 0 ---- 82 (0) 6 2 1 10 6 0 1 0 ---- 26 (5) 10 6 8 53 26 3 2 0 ---- 108 (5)	35 21 71 369 184 29 15 2 ---- 728 (9)

* Aircraft receiving any degree of combat damage but is economically repairable

The performance of the U.S. Air Force in support of LAM SON 719 was no less impressive. A total of 9,000 tactical air sorties were flown, to include 7,000 over lower Laos. The highest daily number of sorties reached 277 on 8 March 1971. (Table 8)

Table 8 - U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Support

Total Sorties Flown Average Sorties/Day Highest Number of Sorties on Any One Day (8 March 1971) Total Ton Ordinance Delivered Number of Aircraft Lost

In Laos 7104 103 10931

In South Vietnam 2010 29 3100

Total 9114 132 277 14031 7

During the course of the operation, a total of 25 "Commando Vault" bombs (15,000-lb) were dropped by C-130 aircraft to clear landing zones and also to strike against specific targets such as warehouses, vehicle parks and enemy troop concentrations. Armed fixed wing aircraft such Page 133 as AC-119 "Stingers" and AC-130 "Spectres" and AC-130 "Candlestick" flareships were particularly effective in attacking and destroying enemy trucks moving by night and in providing close support for ARVN forces engaged in fire fights. These aircraft accounted for about 50-60 enemy trucks destroyed. The results obtained by U.S. tactical air support to include both U.S. Air Force and U.S. Naval Air are outlined in Table 9.

Table 9 - Bomb Damage Assessment, U.S. Tactical Air

Enemy Killed by Air Secondary Explosions Secondary Fires Destroyed: Structures/Bunkers Trucks Tanks Antiaircraft Weapons Radar Sites

In Laos 3103 6694 779 471 179 59 165 1

In South Vietnam 61 234 207 421 1 0 2 0

Total 3164 6928 986 892 198 59 167 1

Total losses and casualties incurred by USAF tactical air units in support of the operation amounted to seven aircraft destroyed (3 F- 4's, 1 F-l00, 1 A-7, 1 A-1, and 1 0-2) and 4 pilots killed in action. Other pilots who had been shot down over Laos were all rescued. U.S. Naval aircraft also contributed significantly to the support of LAM SON 719 with nearly 1,900 sorties launched from U.S. carriers Hancock, Kitty Hawk and Ranger. A particularly important role in air support was performed by the B-52s in the annihilation of enemy installations, rear bases and troop concentrations. In Operation LAM SON 719, B-52 sorties were also used to clear landing zones and to provide close support for ARVN forces in Page 136 many emergency situations. Several ARVN units learned how to use B-52 strikes in their plans for combat maneuvering with skill. Total B-52 strikes in support of LAM SON 719 amounted to 622, to include 421 for the benefit of ARVN forces and 201 in support of U.S. forces. (Table 10)

Table 10 - B-52 "Arc Light" Operation Summary, LAM SON 719

	PHASE I (Planning)	PHASE II (8 Feb - 5 Mar 71)	PHASE III (6 Mar - 15 Mar 71)	PHASE IV (16 Mar - 7 Apr 71)	Total
NOMINATED I Corps U.S. TOTAL	0 8 8	175 93 129	90 39 129	132 212 344	397 352 746
SCHEDULED I Corps U.S. TOTAL	0 7 7	158 87 245	86 39 125	129 175 304	373 308 681
DIVERTS I Corps U.S. MACV TOTAL	0 0 0 0	93 16 10 119	86 0 2 88	153 16 15 184	332 32 27 391
ABORTS	0	9	6	17	32
STRIKES I Corps U.S. TOTAL	0 7 7	189 37 226	97 20 117	135 137 272	421 201 622
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT	18	670	359	807	1854
TONS OF BOMBS	456.75	14435.50	9261.75	22705.25	46859.25

Page 137 The assessment of bomb damage inflicted by B-52 missions was nearly impossible to carry out, however. In general, only about 10% of all B-52 targets were searched through by ground troops; their BDA reports are sumarized in Table 11. In addition secondary explosions were observed by B-52 air crews and other aerial observers over 480 targets.

Table 11 - BDA Results on 55 Arc Light Targets

Categories of Damage KIA WIA INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CREW SERVED WEAPONS MORTARS ROCKET LAUNCHERS AAA AA/AW TRUCKS TRACKS ARTILLERY PIECES AMMUNITION FOOD STRUCTURES BICYCLES BUNKERS FUEL

Quantities 2644 12 1541 82 93 300 16 (INCLUDES 23MM, 37MM and 57MM WEAPONS) 41 (INCLUDES 12.7MM WEAPONS) 72 11 (INCLUDES ONE TANK) 13 933 TONS 1101 TONS 890 300 176 151,925 GALLONS

Last but not least, U.S. artillery units, despite their location on the RVN side of the border, contributed significantly to the effective support of ARVN forces due to their long range and accurate fire. Their support was particularly useful at night or in bad weather. (Table 12) Page 138

Table 12 - U.S. and ARVN Artillery Support

Caliber	Number of Tubes	Missions	Rounds	Number Pieces Combat Loss
US 105mm 155mm 175mm 8 inchTOTAL	6 28 20 8 62	111 5738 6946 2373 15168	3197 132278 36695 16392 208962	0 0 4 0 4
ARVN 105mm 155mmTOTAL	152 48 200	Unknown Unknown Unknown	240709 70228 310937	70 26 96
TOTAL	262	15168* (US ONLY)	519899	100

* This figure does not include 4969 missions flown by two batteries of U.S. Aerial Field Artillery (24 helicopters)

In summary, during their 45-day incursion into lower Laos, ARVN forces of I Corps inflicted on the enemy heavy casualties amounting to at least 50% of the combat forces he had committed to the area of operation. A sizeable dent had thus been made into the participating elements of five NVA divisions, the 2d, 304th, 308th, 320th, and 324B, and the logistical units in Base Areas 604 and 611. In exchange for these results, I Corps suffered casualties equivalent to 45% of the combat strength it had committed in the operation not to mention substantial losses in equipment. Although not a protracted campaign, LAM SON 719 brought about profound repercussions among the South Vietnamese people. Despite official claims of a "big victory" and mass demonstrations to celebrate the "lower Laos victory," the people still were shocked by the severe losses incurred. Perhaps the greatest emotional shock of all was the unprecedented fact that ARVN forces had to leave behind in Laos a substantial number of their dead and wounded. This came Page 139 as a horrendous trauma for those unlucky families who, in their traditional devotion to the cult of the dead and their attachment to the living, were condemned to live in perpetual sorrow and doubt. It was a violation of beliefs and familial piety that Vietnamese sentiment would never forget and forgive. Observations and Evaluation Operation LAM SON 719 was terminated unexpectedly and in haste. Despite official denials to the contrary by GVN authorities, the fact could not be hidden from the inquisitive media reporters of the Free World. The campaign had lasted only 45 days, much shorter than its intended duration, but it was long enough to create a disquieting impact on the troops and population alike. Much speculation had arisen about the merits of the operation measured against the losses and casualties that I Corps had suffered. Was it worth all the bloodshed and the bodies and wounded left behind? Was it a victory or a defeat? Popular sentiment seemed to be aroused by the dramatic accounts and personal feelings of the I Corps troops who returned from Laos. Almost without exception, they did not believe they were victorious. To political and military leaders of South Vietnam, the Laotian incursion offered further proof of close cooperation between the U.S. and RVN in the face of the enemy's threat. They had long coveted such an action but knew that South Vietnam alone could not destroy the war sustaining lifeline from North Vietnam so they had welcomed the American initiative with unconcealed enthusiasm. The general situation at that time also lent itself to a focus of attention on our objectives in lower Laos. The turnabout in Cambodia's political attitude and the resulting cross-border operations of 1970 brought about encouraging prospects of denying safe havens and storage areas to the enemy in that terminal section of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The prospects would look still better if the Communist lifeline could be cut at its most sensitive point - in lower Laos. Domestically, the Vietnamization program was making excellent progress. After the Cambodian Page 140 incursion of 1970, the RVNAF felt as if they had matured overnight and desired another chance to prove it. With every passing day, the security situation looked better and better despite our anticipation of additional reductions in U.S. combat forces; at the beginning of 1971 a total of over 250,000 U.S. troops had already departed since the Vietnamization program was initiated and another redeployment increment was scheduled in the near future. Politically, two important events, the RVN and U.S. presidential elections, in late 1971 and 1972 respectively, were drawing near. These and the improved military situation in South Vietnam joined hands to provide the rationale for LAM SON 719. Once the decision had been made, the combined planning for the operation between Vietnamese and American staffs became a shining example of close and effective cooperation. By the time the J-3, JGS relayed the official decision to the I Corps commander and briefed him on the general concept of the operation, the initial planning process was already underway by the I Corps and the U.S. XXIV Corps staffs. This was made possible by an instant exchange of data concerning the enemy situation, U.S. support, characteristics of the area of operations, especially those pertaining to North Vietnam and the target area which were almost exclusively provided by the C-2, U.S. XXIV Corps. Everything that should be known by I Corps about the enemy was made available including order of battle on NVA forces in North Vietnam and Laos, the status of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and enemy activities on it, the situation in Base Areas 604 and 611, and disposition of enemy units and detailed information on the enemy's anti-aircraft capabilities in the area of operation. Aerial photos were scrutinized with particular care. Our intensive study and planning resulted in estimates that bolstered confidence. The enemy's opposition would be initially light. His antiaircraft system would be effectively neutralized by our devastating firepower. Our helilift capabilities and mechanized assets would make short work of the occupation of key objectives. Initially, it was thought that Tchepone could be ours after three days of combat. (6) Page 141 Naturally, after that, our search activities would expand and continue until the enemy's logistical system in the area of operation was effectively strangled. Although there was no official record of the anticipated duration of the campaign, it could be inferred from public statements and private comments made by authorities that the operation was to last until the onset of the rainy season in lower Laos, or about early May 1971. From then on, monsoon rains over the Truong Son Mountain Range would inhibit the enemy's infiltration and logistic activities. The close coordination between I Corps and U.S. XXIV Corps continued during the entire course of the operation by a constant exchange of combat information which resulted in appropriate modifications of the original plan and even better cooperation. Intelligence continued to be an important aspect of the combined effort. Initial data provided by U.S. forces were corroborated and complemented by battle reports and intelligence gathered from enemy prisoners and ralliers which in time became particularly important with regard to the confirmation of enemy units, the movements of enemy troops and the day to day situation along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. All these data were shared between the U.S. and ARVN staffs. During the initial phase of the campaign, the advance of ARVN units was bold, swift and effective. The concept of maneuvering along ridgelines by helilift combined with a series of fire support bases allowed an audacious progress, well supported by artillery. Heliborne movements were coordinated with an armor thrust; these forces linked up at predetermined objectives along the axis of the main effort. Both the northern and southern flanks of this effort were also protected and once the final objective was attained, the actual search of the target area and exploitation of combat gains could be expanded. This was a sound concept whose success depended on the superiority enjoyed by ARVN in terms of heliborne mobility, air power and mechanized capabilities. Swift progress made step by step and from peak to peak, and occupation of dominating terrain features by a series of mutually supporting fire support bases where the essence of that concept. It was in fact the faithful transplant of a combat tactic that had worked for so Page 142 many years in South Vietnam and should work in lower Laos, given the considerable concentration of resources. This also offered the ARVN forces an opportunity to put into combat practice what they had learned from combined operations with U.S. forces. The rough, jungled terrain of lower Laos proved particularly difficult for ARVN forces. In every advance, they were apt to be engaged by the enemy in heavy firefights. At almost all prominent terrain features in the area, they met head on with solid defensive positions deployed by enemy logistic units. This defense system, consisting of mutually supporting, well dug in, crescent shape, covered trench segments, which the enemy called "horseshoe blocks," was extremely difficult and time consuming to break through since their destruction would require accurate, highly concentrated artillery fire. One of the first major problems that our forces had to face, in addition to the enemy's blocking positions, was his elusive but devastating anti-aircraft system. The most common weapon he used against our air-craft was the 12.7-mm heavy machinegun which constantly switched firing positions. In addition, throughout the area, there were about 200 AAA pieces from 23-mm up to 100-mm, some of them radar controlled. Even these heavy weapons frequently changed their firing positions which were usually well concealed. In general, the enemy's anti-aircraft system seemed to be well coordinated and its fire controlled with skill and discipline. His heavy machineguns such as 12.7-mm, 14.5-mm or even 23-mm, were arranged in a diamond or circle pattern, affording mutual protection and providing a well coordinated fire trap. For example, one weapon could open fire to draw our aircraft to it and when our aircraft made the attack, it would enter another weapon's field of fire. Enemy AAA positions not only changed frequently, they also moved in uncomfortably close to our units in coordination with an envelopment and attack by infantry troops. As a result, they were extremely difficult to destroy and the price our helicopters had to pay when lifting troops, delivering supplies or evacuating the wounded was high. Page 143 Another enemy weapon that was least expected in view of the adverse terrain in lower Laos was the tank. Since the very first days of the operation, our troops had detected and reported traces of tracked vehicles. Then enemy prisoners provided additional information which pointed to the presence of an armor regiment in the area. It was only later when some of these tanks made their appearance that they were observed and attacked by U.S. aircraft. Then, a combined infantry-armor attack against FSB 31 made it all too clear that tanks were being used extensively by the enemy although in a rather unorthodox manner. In his attack against FSB 30, for example, the enemy used tanks only to provide direct support fire, and at FSB Delta, his flame throwing tanks repulsed a counterattack by our Marine troops. The enemy's employment of armor was even more unorthodox in that tanks were used individually to ambush our troops along well concealed jungle paths, as if they were playing a hide and seek game. This tactic worked because the enemy knew well the system of paths that crisscrossed the area. Against our armor or truck convoys, enemy tanks were usually positioned in ambush, then suddenly opened fire and withdrew quickly into jungle paths. In addition to PT-76's, the enemy also employed medium T-54 and T-34 tanks whose 100-mm and 85-mm guns had a greater firepower than our 76-mm M-41 light tanks. Confined to a one way road with little room for cross-country maneuvers, ARVN armor units found themselves in an extremely disadvantageous position. While enemy infantry troops seemed to have excellent anti-tank capabilities with their B-40 and B-41 teams and their ambush tactics, our infantrymen were not well prepared against enemy tanks. ARVN airborne troops, for example, complained about the ineffectiveness of the M-72 light anti-tank weapon(7). As a result, old 3.5" rocket launchers Page 144 and new 90-mm recoilless rifles were quickly brought in as replacements. Even U.S. gun-ships during the early stage of the operation were not armed with HEAT rockets which were required to knock out tanks. Our head on collision with enemy tanks, therefore, was obviously a big tactical surprise. Enemy artillery also posed a challenge that could not be easily met. In the first place, mortars of all calibers formed close rings of fire around our positions. Their continuous firing indicated that the enemy had an ample supply of ammunition which was probably pre-positioned. Next came recoilless rifles, rockets and artillery of all types. For the first time in the war, ARVN forces came to grips with the deadly fire of enemy 152-mm howitzers and 130-mm guns which had a range far greater than their own 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers. Enemy artillery was emplaced in scattered, individual positions, some dug into mountain slopes to elude our counter battery fire. In action, several pieces would open fire at the same time from several directions, making them all the more difficult for our forces to locate. Without field radar, ARVN forces had to rely on their technique of crater analysis which did not produce accurate results. The enemy effectively coordinated all his capabilities, to include antiaircraft, artillery, mortars and massive infantry formations to envelop and overrun our FSBs as well as our mobile units. As soon as a FSB was established or a unit had debarked on a landing zone, the enemy's encirclement process would begin, first by mortars which moved in at close range around the position and opened fire every time helicopters landed or took off. Then, antiaircraft teams and infantry units advanced to complete the ring, always keeping as close as they could to our position, while from many directions further away, enemy artillery guns zeroed in to create a continuing state of tension within our base. The surrounding web of antiaircraft weapons, mortars and artillery gradually became so thick that the base was effectively isolated and no re-supply or medical evacuation activities could be conducted. A FSB was usually occupied and defended by an ARVN battalion which normally deployed from two to three companies to man a security Page 145 belt around the base. This ARVN tactic worked fine in South Vietnam in most situations. However, in the face of a more concentrated encirclement combined with artillery fire and ground attacks and frequently with an armor thrust, this ARVN defensive tactic proved to be less effective. Under these conditions, a single battalion was eventually overpowered and lost the initiative. The final attack to overrun a base was usually conducted with a massive concentration of infantry troops usually outnumbering the defenders by three to five times without regard to losses. In the face of these difficulties which ARVN forces were not prepared to meet, Operation LAM SON 719 bogged down as soon as it reached Ban Dong. First the rangers, then the paratroopers, and finally the armor troops, all had the chance to prove their gallantry in combat and indeed inflicted severe losses to the enemy. But by this time, the ARVN forces had lost their initiative and our vigorous offensive thrust was blunted. The state of inconclusive, seesaw fighting continued until the beginning of March when, with increased U.S. helilift and firepower support, the 2d Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division succeeded in landing in Tchepone, the major terrain objective of the entire operation. For all its merits, this exploit was more a symbolic gesture than a real achievement. It merely meant that "we were there." The 2d Regiment did not stay long in Tchepone. The imbalance of forces by that time precluded any attempt at holding and exploiting this objective. Our success in reaching Tchepone was largely due to a flexibility in plans and the awesome capability of U.S. helicopters. The real prize, however, was not to be found there. It was located further west where the enemy's more important supply caches still lay unsheltered on the ground. But ARVN forces could not get there nor could they afford to linger long in Tchepone. As swiftly as they came in, they were extracted in haste before the enemy had time to regroup and react. A previous prolonged search of the area of Route 914 by the 1st Division had shown that enemy reactions were swift. This was another indication of our inability to achieve what had been originally intended. It was true that U.S. helicopters helped with the maneuvering Page 146 of our forces but the overall tactical imbalance that prevailed at that time made it impossible for ARVN forces to hold terrain and exploit the gains. This was a truth that no one could deny. Throughout the operation, the role played by U.S. combat support was particularly illustrious. It was evident that without this support, no incursion would have been possible, much less on such a large scale. The fact that ARVN forces were able to progress into Laos as far as Tchepone was a measure of the significance of United States support. When enemy resistance developed into such proportions that no further progress was possible, it became all the more obvious that without U.S. combat troops in the rear and without U.S. helicopters and tactical air support for the frontline, it would have been impossible to withdraw with any satisfactory degree of unit integrity. U.S. support assets were plentiful, but it appeared that during the early stage of the operation, their control and coordination were not entirely satisfactory. Part of the problem seemed to derive from the physical separation of major operational headquarters. The U.S. XXIV Corps Forward CP was installed at Quang Tri Base while its counterpart, I Corps Forward CP was at Dong Ha, about 10 miles to the northwest. Still, another important element of I Corps Forward CP, the operational control staff, was located further west at Ham Nghi Base (Khe Sanh) which was 35 miles southwest of Dong Ha. Operating on the principle of cooperation and coordination, both the U.S. and ARVN staffs found it difficult to work effectively while physically separated. At Ham Nghi Base, an important hub of support activities where all ARVN divisions' rear echelon headquarters and U.S. forward support agencies were located, there was no official representative of the Commanding General, U.S. XXIV Corps with authority for control and coordination. All decisions pertaining to support and the distribution of support assets had to be made at the Quang Tri Base. As a result, at the forward echelon, the direction of support effort suffered from delays and the coordination of support activities was too loose for a fast changing tactical situation which required timely decisions on the spot. Page 147 This shortcoming was remedied however, when a U.S. Joint Coordinating Group (JCG) was established on 1 March 1977 under the control of the Commander, U.S 108th Artillery Group who represented, the Commanding General, U.S. XXIV Corps. Members of the JCG included the deputy commander U.S. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) who acted as an aviation officer, a representative of the G-3, U.S. XXIV Corps, and a representative of the U.S. 7th Air Force (not a permanent member). Co-located with I Corps Tactical Control CP at Ham Nghi Base, this Joint Coordinating Group proved to be extremely effective in the rapid coordination of U.S. combat support assets. Working hand in hand with the I Corps commander and his staff who provided timely data for the planning of support operations, the JCG chief and his aviation officer were able to assist them in the process of operational planning and decision making by providing expert advice. Although a combined operation, LAM SON 719 had an unusual character of its own. It was the first large scale operation undertaken without the direct participation of U.S. advisers. Long accustomed to the presence of advisers which they found reassuring and invaluable, especially in difficult combat situations, ARVN regimental and battalion commanders went into Laos with apprehensive feelings. They realized that this was going to be a difficult challenge and they were not too sure they could handle the problem of communications with supporting U.S. units. This had always been an exclusive service provided by their advisers in addition to regular and routine advisory assistance. But they had to accomplish all requirements by themselves this time, and despite some apprehensions, they all felt proud and believed they could excel without their advisers. After all, as unit commanders, they were accustomed to assuming responsibility which they routinely discharged without difficulty whether it was administrative work, troop training or the conduct of combat operations with only ARVN support. Their self assurance and determination was demonstrated throughout LAM SON 719. Due to special arrangements to provide Vietnamese interpreters aboard FAC and AFCC aircraft, ARVN unit commanders handled the problem of calling for U.S. support quite professionally. Page 148 U.S. advisers could have helped more had they been permitted to do so. As it was, only one member from each division advisory team was allowed in the air at any time over his division's tactical area of responsibility. The division senior advisers were not allowed to overfly Laos at any time. Although the advisers in the air over the divisions monitored the situation closely and helped greatly in difficult problems of support, they were often overwhelmed by requests for assistance from several divisional units which were being engaged by the enemy simultaneously. Confined to the divisions' rear echelon CPs inside South Vietnam, the senior advisers were able only to expedite support through reports or map studies. The question has often surfaced concerning President Thieu's personal influence on the operation. From the beginning it was obvious that his influence was decisive. It was he who approved the idea of launching an offensive into lower Laos, concurred with the general concept of operation and decided to augment the forces for I Corps. The JGS only acted with his approval. The attachment of the Airborne and Marine Divisions to I Corps for the offensive effort, for example, could not have been done without President Thieu's personal approval. But the selection of 8 February as D- day, as far as I can determine, was a recommendation of the combined planning staffs of I Corps and the U.S. XXIV Corps. President Thieu had been briefed on this selected date by the I Corps commander. Therefore, without strong reasons for a change, the I Corps commander apparently felt committed to the decision that he had recommended and obtained from the President. But President Thieu's role was not confined just to the decision to proceed with the operation. At least on two occasions, the directives he gave to the I Corps commander clearly affected the course of the operation itself. During a visit to I Corps on 19 February, in the company of a central government delegation, he received an operational briefing presented by the participating ARVN field commanders. During this briefing they outlined for him the serious difficulties being met by ARVN units in lower Laos with the implied suggestion that a deeper incursion would be inadvisable. At that time, the Ranger 21st and 39th Battalions were being heavily engaged and FSBs 30 and 31 began Page 149 to detect strong enemy pressure. President Thieu made a few remarks to the effect that ARVN forces should take their time and should conduct search operations in the vicinities of their present positions while waiting for developments. From that day on, the Airborne Division would not make any further advance. The second time involved the decision to push into Tchepone. On 28 February, President Thieu met again with the I Corps commander in Saigon. By this time, progress on the ground had been stalled for over two weeks and the foreign press was publicizing daily ARVN's inability to advance further. During this meeting, it was President Thieu who decided that ARVN forces should go into Tchepone. As a result, General Lam produced his plan to occupy Tchepone and President Thieu ordered the JOS to reinforce I Corps with the entire Marine Division and additional armor elements. The attack against Tchepone was conceived merely as a short term raid to be conducted primarily for its propaganda and morale value. Although President Thieu suggested that the Marine Division be used to relieve the Airborne Division in the main effort, General Lam convinced him that the 1st Division would be better in this role, while the marines could be employed to protect the rear and the LOC. The division commanders present also agreed that the advance, except for the raid to Tchepone, should be suspended until the enemy's intentions and capabilities became more clear. The field commanders and General Lam also persuaded President Thieu that reinforcement with the 2d Division in Laos would not improve the situation. Now that the initiative had been largely assumed by the NVA, a much more potent force than the 2d Division would be required to recapture it. Finally, President Thieu's desire to conduct a raid in force into Muong Nong ceased to be a practicable course of action by the time the withdrawal was beginning and General Lam exercised his command prerogatives by not attempting it. It was clear that President Thieu listened carefully to the recommendations of his field commanders, that he did not arbitrarily impose rigid instructions upon them, but that he allowed them the latitude in the execution of plans and orders that combat commanders must have. Page 150 The conduct of the operation was also plagued by dissension verging on insubordination among some ARVN field commanders. Lieutenant General Lam was never able to exercise full control over the commanders of the Airborne and Marine Divisions who were his equals in rank. Of the two, Lieutenant General Du Quoc Dong, the paratrooper, proved to be more submissive, but he did not always carry out the I Corps commander's orders in a strict manner. Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang, Commander of the Marine Division, who was more senior in rank than the I Corps commander, delegated his command authority to his deputy, Colonel Bui The Lan, who directly exercised operational control over the entire division. While occasionally present at the Marine Division's rear echelon CP, General Khang never attended any official operational briefings presided over by the I Corps Commander. Because of this, the Marine Division acted independently on a few occasions when the odds were against it. For example, it made its own decision to abandon FSB Hotel and withdraw its troops from Laos. President Thieu and General Vien, Chief of the JGS, were probably aware of the discord among their subordinates, but they took no remedial action. Perhaps General Lam did not ask for such an action. Or perhaps the matter was so delicate among these generals, who were all considered pillars of the regime, that it defied any easy solution. This dissension among commanders adversely affected staff coordination between I Corps and the Airborne and Marine Divisions. Many reports were delayed; at times, there were no reports at all. As a result, I Corps was unable to control the situation effectively, especially when the enemy pressure began to increase significantly. Because of this, General Lam chose an organic unit of I Corps, the 1st Division, for the Tchepone mission instead of the Airborne or Marine Division. LAM SON 719 was further impeded by advance news dispatches in the press. During the preparatory period, reporters were not allowed into the Quang Tri area but this aroused their curiosity and gave rise to speculation. The press seemed to be able to pick up leads and develop them into news dispatches that gave every detail of the operation as of the end of January 1971. Thus, the advantages of surprise were lost very Page 151 early and the enemy had ample time to prepare. As early as during the first days of February, Tchepone had already been mentioned as an objective. After that, U.S. Government officials publicly praised the merits of the Laotian campaign which would ensure the continued redeployment of U.S. forces. Then on 8 February, the day I Corps forces crossed the border into Laos, President Thieu went on TV to personally break the news to the Vietnamese public. As the operation continued, press reports increasingly focused on the small district town of Tchepone as the final objective. To the RVN, it had become an objective to be attained at all costs. While the RVN announced that its troops had occupied Tchepone, North Vietnam quickly and loudly disclaimed it. The GVN in the mean time received foreign press reporters with a total lack of enthusiasm and did not allow them easy access to battleground visits as it had during other operations. This increased suspicion and speculation. Subsequent press articles and pictures depicting the withdrawal of ARVN troops from Laos further confused attempts at assessing the offensive campaign correctly, particularly by foreign observers. However, with the exception of the minority elite in big cities, the South Vietnamese general public was not influenced by the foreign press. Still, the initial publicity about LAM SON 719 looked embarrassingly hollow in their eyes in view of the hasty termination of the operation. This impression lingered on despite official announcements of victory and the ribbons and medals awarded to the "victorious" troops of I Corps. If the premature conclusion of the Laotian campaign could not be effectively screened from the outside world, it was all too clear to insiders that the campaign was an unfinished job. The intended and desired goal to sustain combat until the onset of the rainy season in order to strangle the enemy's supply route could not be accomplished. Only 45 days after ARVN forces had crossed the border, they were already back in South Vietnam. The two lesser raids that were subsequently conducted sought to enhance the public image of the RVNAF more than to achieve military gains. Finally, the returns produced by LAM SON 719 in terms of enemy caches destroyed were not even as impressive Page 152 as those of the Cambodian incursion. For one thing, ARVN forces had stopped short of the real prize, the area west of Tchepone where most of the enemy's supplies lay vulnerable on the ground. For another, the search and destruction of Base Area 611 could not be carried out as planned because the tactical balance no longer favored the continuation of the operation in that direction. Regardless of these shortcomings, a substantial number of the objectives had been accomplished which required ARVN units to fight hard and incur great sacrifices. Topping the honor roll, the 1st ARVN Infantry Division stood up to its reputation as the number one ARVN combat unit. The division's organic units maneuvered with skill and were well led; its well disciplined troops fought with gallantry and dedication. During its 42 days of operation in Laos, the division was extremely active south of Route No. 9. Switching its effort during the final days, it successfully pushed toward Tchepone and occupied it. During the withdrawal, some of its units were heavily engaged and suffered losses. Despite this, the 1st Infantry Division accomplished its mission with top honors. Long considered as the elite unit of the RVNAF, the Airborne Division did not perform as brilliantly as its reputation would indicate during LAM SON 719. Despite the enemy's superiority in maneuvering forces and his employment of new weapons, the fact that the division was unable to hold FSB 31 seemed to be indicative of its lack of contingency planning for such a situation. But our airborne units fought extremely well as individual elements. One of the division's brigade commanders was missing in action - probably captured by the enemy; and five out of nine of its battalion commanders were either killed or wounded. This testified to the intense fighting that the division had to face but by and large, the division accomplished nothing spectacular in its assigned mission. During the final stage, the division also failed to provide effective flank protection for the major effort and secure Route No. 9 even with the reinforcement of four armor squadrons. This failure greatly complicated the ARVN withdrawal from Laos. Page 153 As for the Marine Division, it was the first time it had participated in an operation as a division. Accustomed to operating separately at brigade level, and in view of the traditional autonomy of its brigades, the division seemed to have problems of command and control. The 147th Marine Brigade did not succeed in clearing the enemy pressure around FSB Delta despite continuous efforts for several days. Then the division made its own decision to withdraw from FSB Hotel and its positions on the Co Roc promontory, apparently to avoid facing a difficult battle. This action clearly reflected the autonomy enjoyed by the division commander, Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang, who did not consider himself under the control of the I Corps commander but still made tactical decisions that affected the latter's conduct of the operation. Despite this, Marine units fought extremely well during sustained combat under heavy enemy pressure. Regardless of losses, they always retained unit integrity and cohesiveness. The 1st Ranger Group was heavily engaged as soon as it was deployed. Its 39th and 21st Battalions responded well to the enemy's massive attacks and also inflicted severe losses on enemy units. The early withdrawal of this Group did not allow a correct evaluation of its performance. As to ARVN armor units, their employment in LAM SON 719 was perhaps one of the very few occasions of any large concentration during the war. The 1st Armor Brigade was committed initially with only two squadrons; this total was later increased to four in addition to two troops of M-4l light tanks re-deployed from MR-2. These reinforcements were introduced to offset some losses but still the deployment of all these armored forces on a short stretch of narrow jungle road not even 20 kilometers in length and affording no room for maneuver represented perhaps one of the unwisest moves on the part of the tactical commanders involved (8). If this decision was deliberate, then perhaps they had Page 154 seriously underestimated the enemy's capabilities or the restrictions dictated by the terrain in that area. As a result, the 1st Armor Brigade was at a great disadvantage when faced with enemy tanks deep in the jungle. In those circumstances, ARVN armor officers were naturally unable to make effective use of combat tactics they had learned in Western service schools. The brigade commander was also not resourceful enough to meet this unusual combat challenge. The outcome was evident: only one third of the total number of armored vehicles committed managed to return home after accomplishing nothing substantial. If someone was to be held responsible for this failure, the question would arise as to whether it should be the commander of the brigade or his superior, who committed this unit to such an undesirable and impossible situation. In contrast, I Corps artillery performed exceptionally well during the entire operation. Fire coordination between ARVN and U.S. supporting units was extremely flexible and effective. Divisional artillery units providing direct support in Laos fared less well, however. Their deployment was also limited. Each infantry regiment or brigade was supported by only one 105-mm battery and one 155-mm battery. Given the number of artillery pieces left behind in Laos after the hasty withdrawal, one may wonder whether we should have committed more artillery assets to the battle. The 1st Air Division, Vietnam Air Force, did not play a significant role in providing close air support for I Corps forces. Its participation and contributions were rather modest even by RVNAP standards due to the availability of the United States Air Force. The 1st Area Logistics Command, by contrast, proved to be resourceful and capable enough to meet the challenge of providing support for a corps size operation on short notice. Its lack of initial preparations were more than offset by the solid backing given by U.S. logistical agencies. Page 155 Lessons learned LAM SON 719 reflected quite accurately the strengths and weaknesses of the RVNAF combat effectiveness in almost every area: organization, command, leadership, motivation, operating techniques, planning, and execution. It was impeded by certain significant errors and shortcomings that made the entire effort fall short of its intended goal. Foremost among the most significant problems of LAM SON 719 was perhaps timely tactical intelligence. To give due credit to the intelligence effort, one must admit that intelligence estimates concerning the operation were definitely accurate or nearly accurate as far as enemy capabilities in antiaircraft weapons and troop reinforcements were concerned. However, they were less accurate in other areas. Enemy artillery and armor capabilities were not listed as significant factors. In addition, reports on the area of concentrated supplies were not entirely accurate. Several enemy prisoners in fact disclosed that most supplies caches had been evacuated to areas outside the AO. The enemy appeared not to be surprised at all; by contrast, he had been prepared and expecting our forces to come in. This led to the conclusion that several things concerning the enemy had eluded our collection capabilities. Once more, the Vietnam war seemed to have taught us some useful things about intelligence and security. To be more effective, a more extensive collection network would seem to be indicated with emphasis on human intelligence in the areas under enemy control. Then, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of enemy capabilities should be made with the full cognizance that they were apt to change very rapidly and as a result, estimates would have to concentrate not only on the current situation but also on how it was going to change. At the same time, for an operation of that scale and importance, a more conscious effort at deceiving the enemy by a comprehensive deception scheme perhaps would have helped offset the adverse effect of publicity and effectively confused the enemy. What we did for LAM SON 719 was certainly not enough for the purpose contemplated. Page 156 Planning and preparations for the offensive were another major area that needed improvement. The operational plan for LAM SON 719 was adequate only so long as the operation progressed smoothly and ARVN forces were able to hold the initiative. It should have taken contingencies into full consideration and been able to respond to them with resourcefulness. The extent and intensity of enemy reactions, for example, were one contingency that planners apparently overlooked. Then the enemy could well reinforce his resistance by diversionary actions elsewhere in South Vietnam, too. The absence of contingency planning was a glaring deficiency of LAM SON 719. ARVN units were also not thoroughly prepared when they went into Laos. Elite troops like the paratroopers, for example, had problems using the M-72 light anti-tank weapon. Several other units did not have enough warm clothes and blankets for their troops. FSB 31, which was supposed to serve as a major supporting base during the entire course of the operation, had only a most rudimentary defense system: a single concertina ring thrown around it. The command and control center of the 3d Airborne Battalion, which was responsible for the defense of FSB 31, was sheltered only by 12 PSP sheets protecting the battalion headquarters, its S-3 section, and communications and medical elements. With this kind of defense and protection, how could FSB 31 hold out against enemy 130-mm shells and tanks? Obviously, planning and preparations should have been more extensive, more careful. The problem of preparations was closely related to the need to preserve secrecy. How to proceed with preparations at the unit level while keeping them from being detected by the enemy? That was a major problem that needed to be solved. At the JGS level, even the J-2 was not informed about the operational plan until the campaign had started. He did not have the opportunity to contribute to the planning process either his intelligence data or his own expert assessment of the enemy's capabilities. I Corps staff agencies other than the G-2 and G-3 divisions, and those of participating units were similarly left out. It seemed as though the whole undertaking had been just a contingency action to meet a difficult situation. Page 157 As far as command and control were concerned, the most important problem to be solved was insubordination on the part of general reserve unit commanders who like many other generals considered themselves the pillars of the regime. The I Corps commander apparently bowed to the political powers of these generals and this adversely affected his conduct of the operation. The (insubmissive attitude of the Marine and Airborne Division commanders was actually inexcusable in that they placed themselves above the national interest and let their personal pride interfere with the task of defeating the enemy. For the operation to succeed as planned, the problem of effective command had to be satisfactorily solved above everything else because it affected the relationship between subordinate staffs and the control of the operation itself. At least, the I Corps commander should have been given the authority to require that his orders be strictly carried out. The arrangements for effective operational control did not necessarily require the traditional echelons of tactical command posts as had been organized: main CP, forward CP and tactical control CP. In view of effective signal communications and the availability of command ships, the tactical control CP and the forward CP could be combined into one. Its location was immaterial as long as the CP was able to exercise effective control and coordination of subordinate units. At this operational CP, there should have been adequate staff personnel, a clear division of responsibilities among staff elements and full authority should have been given them to solve every problem at hand without having to refer to another echelon of command. The effective functioning of this CP would inspire confidence among subordinate units and their staffs. The breaking down of I Corps headquarters into three echelons for the control of LAM SON 719 required a dilution of its limited staff personnel with the end result that no echelon was able to function properly. ARVN units that participated in the operation definitely lacked a system of accurate and timely reporting. This was not only a matter of training or experience but also a matter of loyalty. A higher command's exercise of control was only as effective as its subordinate Page 158 units' reporting was reliable. In the case of LAM SON 719, this reporting was most deplorable. Because the intensity of the fighting did not permit frequent visits by the I Corps and division commanders, they depended entirely on reports for the control of the situation. But reports by their subordinate units were slow, inaccurate, and sometimes non-existent. During the operation, there were several instances in which division commanders lost control of their units. Even the I Corp. commander sometimes did not know the major events affecting his divisions. A significant development which turned out to be extremely valuable for the effective support of the operation was the creation of the Joint Coordinating Group (JCG) by the XXIV Corps as of the beginning of March 1971. The group exercised operational control of all U.S. support activities. Its centralized coordinating authority was instrumental in providing timely and appropriate support for every ARVN combat need during the operation. Co-located with the I Corps tactical control CP, the Joint Coordinating Group assisted it with invaluable data for effective planning. An organization of this type was clearly indicated for every combined effort in which the U.S. only played a supporting role. On its part, the ARVN could have benefited more if it had established a counterpart "support coordination center" or equivalent to coordinate ARVN support activities with those of U.S. units through the JCG. This would have enabled the operational commander to monitor closely the flow of support activities and plan his tactical moves more systematically. In the area of combat tactics, a most remarkable feature of LAM.SON 719 was the use of semi-fixed fire support bases installed on high peaks. This tactic was a duplication of the American usage in South Vietnam. But the situation in lower Laos did not favor the installation of these FSBs for the reason that the area of operation had been under enemy control for a long time; the enemy was well entrenched and well organized for defense. The several peaks in the area gave the enemy an advantage in observation which resulted in accurate indirect fire on our fixed fire control bases. The amount of troops deployed for the defense of Page 159 each FSB was also not adequate. The inevitable result was that our units were immobilized in these FSBs and gradually became fixed targets for enemy encirclement and attacks. Most of the 96 artillery pieces lost in Laos resulted from our system of lame duck FSBs. This system could have been replaced by other alternatives such as mobile FSBs, selection of lower, more accessible sites and increased use of mortars to augment artillery firepower. A system of mobile FSBs would have fully utilized the U.S. helilift capabilities; it would also have afforded better defense and greater opportunities to keep the offensive moving. Heliborne operations as a tactic were thoroughly put to test during the Laotian campaign because they were conducted in an area of operation where fighting was more intense than in any past experience in South Vietnam and where the enemy's antiaircraft system was effective. But the U.S. Army's rules governing these operations seemed to hold fast and were proved valid. However, their execution could stand some improvement in terms of coordination and fire support; in any case, it should be done with expertise and attention to details. First, it appeared that the enemy would have been confused if more landing zones (LZ) had been prepared than were really needed. B-52 strikes should not be used too far in advance of the actual landings. After that other types of firepower could be used to prepare LZs. Experience showed that it would be better to divide the area into several sectors, each sector assigned to a particular type of firepower so that all the various types firepowers available could be applied at the same time to achieve a maximum effect: tactical air, aerial artillery, air cavalry, ground artiliery, etc. The use of fire power should not be confined to the preparation of LZS; it should also be directed against avenues of approach and areas where enemy artillery or troops concentration were suspected. Shortly before the landings, all firepower should be concentrated for the last time on the selected sites. Next, air cavalry elements would carry out their classic reconnaissance mission. Since they were familiar with LZ sites, local terrain and flight approaches, the air cavalry commander should be made responsible for fire coordination. When landings began, support fire Page 160 should be continued but diverted to other pre-selected areas. Aircraft laid smoke screens could be useful to conceal landing activities; they could also be used elsewhere to deceive the enemy. Air cavalry reconnaissance, in the meantime, should extend its coverage to protect landings. For command and control purposes during landings, at least two command ships should be utilized, one above the pick up zone (PZ) and the other above the LZ. Each should have command authorities aboard with full power to solve contingency problems. Both the air mission commander and the ground commander should be airborne together at the LZ. Alternate troop commanders should be designated in advance to take over in case of accidents. All protective fires and reconnaissance flights should continue until the landings are completed. A basic weakness of ARVN forces participating in LAM SON 719 was their lack of ground mobility. Since the concept of operatio evolved around the extensive use of helicopters, ARVN forces tended to be over dependent on them. They used helicopters indiscriminately for every activity, even for short movements which could have been made more effectively by marching. This was a serious mistake that not only overtaxed U.S. helilift units but also incurred their complaints. The use of helicopters should have been conceived more judiciously and then only for extensive movements such as a shift of effort direction, the move toward Tchepone, or an exploitation of gains and creating surprise for the enemy. More troops movements should have been made by marching to ensure discretion and initiative. In this regard, the 1st Infantry Division was particularly commendable. Another short coming of ARVN units at battalion and lower levels was their failure to maneuver when being engaged. After the first contact, they tended to stop and wait for support rather than conduct probes and maneuver to attack or close in on the enemy. This shortcoming indicated a need for additional training for small unit leaders. With regard to combined arms tactics, there was no doubt that ARVN units had received extensive training but in actual combat they seemed to falter easily. In the face of a formidable enemy, neither the airborne nor the armor units displayed evidence of effective Page 161 cooperation and teamwork. Armored vehicles were mostly used for transportation. When an engagement was made, infantry troops left tanks unprotected in the jungle and tanks were compelled to fend for themselves, alone. It was apparent that because of this lack of teamwork and mutual protection, the Airborne Division and the four armor squadrons could not operate effectively along the road and in the jungle of lower Laos. Another serious shortcoming was the employment of reserves. During LAM SON 719, all participating divisions had their own reserve force. I Corps, on its part, had a reserve force consisting of a Marine brigade and a Ranger group. But the strange thing was that in no instance during the course of the operation was a reserve force thrown into combat to help clear an area from heavy enemy pressure. All reserve forces were used piecemeal at the rear echelon. No commander ever thought of using them at the forward echelon to his advantage. When a FSB was threatened with being overrun, the only course of action our unit commanders took was to destroy the artillery, abandon the base and extricate their troops by helilift. It was apparent that to be more combat effective, ARVN units needed to learn how to organize reserves and employ them decisively on the battlefield. A lesser but no less dangerous shortcoming was the lack of communications security. In general, ARVN units at lower levels were not disciplined enough in the application of security procedures concerning radio communications. At corps and division levels, however, these procedures were more strictly observed through the systematic encoding of messages sent by CW radio or radioteletype. But at lower level units, which made extensive use of FM voice radio sets, communications were usually sent in dear text in sheer disregard of basic encoding procedures. ARVN commanders were accustomed to talking freely over radio networks, using the most rudimentary system of codes. Something was missing in the enforcement of communications discipline among ARVN units. Finally, the withdrawal operation conducted by I Corps was such that this experience should be examined with utmost candor. First of Page 162 all, withdrawing under enemy pressure was always a difficult operation which should be carefully planned and executed. The time allowed for its execution was too short. The extrication of troops by helicopters naturally increased their vulnerability when compared to a withdrawal on foot. However, some movements to the rear on foot were not executed in a satisfactory manner. Our forces suffered serious losses on routes selected for withdrawal because of combined armor-infantry ambushes laid by the enemy. During the withdrawal, the Airborne Division and the entire armor force were unable to ensure protection for their own movements. The Marine units, however, fared much better; their withdrawal was a successful operation. In summary, LAM SON 719 was a bloody field exercise for ARVN forces under the command of I Corps. Nearly 8,000 ARVN soldiers and millions of dollars worth of valuable equipment and materiel were sacrificed. The realities of battles fought in Laos certainly taught us many invaluable lessons that the RVNAF would have to learn in order to defend South Vietnam effectively. Many of these lessons - those that were appropriate for such treatment - became subjects of instruction at RVNAF service schools and training centers. Page 160 (6) Reference Message No. PT008443, datetimed 141435Z Feb. 71 from COMUSMACV to CJCS and CINPAC. (7) It is possible that one of the problems the troopers experienced with the LAW was related to firing the weapon at very close range, shorter than the minimum arming distance of the projectile. (8) The commanders of ARVN I Corps and U.S. XXIV Corps were both armor officers.